(NEW ESSAY COLLECTION ON “LEADING LAND OPERATIONS” in Swedish)
Övlt Daniel Rydberg och jag har sammanställt en volym med 29 essäer på temat ledning av markoperationer. Dessa är skrivna av officerare på högre officersprogrammet i samband med en kurs i markoperationer som Övlt Rydberg och jag ansvarade för (”Ledning av markoperationer”). Essäerna berör det övergripande temat ”offensivt/defensivt tänkande, människan och manövern”.
New article on Practical Examination and the Examination of Practice when teaching war studies to cadets and officers (and others) in The Royal Swedish Academy of War Sciences Proceedings and Journal. In Swedish, but if interested send a message.
Abstract: The ability to lead armed combat is central to an officer. It is clear that the military professionis about more than possessing theoretical knowledge. Thus, in order to achieve an educationalprogram that includes the skills and abilities of the military profession there is a need to lookbeyond traditional written examination and apply practical examination in various forms.In this article we argue that while all practice can and should be examined through practicalexamination, not everything that is practically examined has to be practice. More specifically,this article will focus on the possibilities and limitations with practical examination. Focuswill be on the education of officers within the context of war studies. The article approachesthe issue on the basis of the legal framework for higher education in Sweden, research onteaching and learning in higher education and practice at the Swedish Defence University. Theoverall purpose is to understand practical examination with regard to what is allowed, howit is done with judicial security, and how it can be done in practice. The article also discusseswhat should be practically examined and how this should be done.
I just published a new article in Baltic Defence College’s Journal on Baltic Security – HYBRID WARFARE AND HYBRID THREATS TODAY AND TOMORROW: TOWARDS AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK.
This article first traces the origin of hybrid warfare and the label game surrounding the concept, asking whether it is merely old wine in a new bottle, and if so, whether it is still a useful concept. It is found that while being old wine in new bottles, it is still a good wine well worth drinking. While there is not much new in the concept itself, it is a useful tool to think about past wars, today’s wars and the wars of the future. Thereafter, this paper analyses how hybrid warfare and hybrid threats are to be understood in the context of peace, conflict and war. It is shown how hybrid warfare and threats fit into our traditional understanding of conflict dynamics.
Just published: Special Issue in Asian Perspective on Power, Narratives, and the Role of Third Parties: Understanding Power (Shift) in East Asia with Mikael Weissmann and Mingjiang Li as guest editors.
Abstract: This article explores why the offensive predominates military tactical thinking. With survey results showing an offensive bias among 60 per cent of senior Swedish officers and as many as 80 per cent in the case of the army, it is clear that this is not just a problem of the past but is equally relevant today. The article asks why there is a tendency to perceive and understand offensive tactics as the preferred choice and the way to conduct battle that should be encouraged and preferred. Drawing on existing research and the findings of a pilot study, ten propositions for why the offensive bias exists are tested using a mixed-method approach. Based on the findings, the article develops a model to understand why the offensive dominates military tactical thinking. It is found that the two key constitutive factors behind the offensive bias are military culture and education. These factors most directly and profoundly influence an officer’s identity, perceptions, and thinking. Military culture and education, in turn, work as a prism for four other factors: military history, the theory and principles of war, doctrine and TTPs, and psychological factors.